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The Coloniality of Western Philosophy: 
Chinese Philosophy as Viewed in France
by Marie-Julie Frainais-Maitre
Abstract
Chinese philosophy is little known in France and is not
generally recognised by twenty-first century French
philosophers as a philosophy. They often regard its
contributions as wisdom, thought or spirituality. But when we
study it in detail, we are clearly faced with a philosophy. Why
then is Chinese philosophy isolated from philosophy in France?
Is it perhaps only the Western world that has the right and
ability to think? Does not China also think? This paper attempts
to understand this state of affairs by seeking clues that might
explain why the notion that Chinese philosophy is not
philosophy remains prevalent in France today. This issue may
be understood if we place it in the context of the relationship
between the West and the others, and therefore in a colonialist,
orientalist and eurocentrist perspective. It is possibly because
the world remains caught in a persistent intellectual coloniality
and an entrenched eurocentrism of thought, such that the West
does not recognise the philosophies of ‘others’. The West still
occupies the epistemological centre of the world and constitutes
a unique reference point of knowledge. Finally, some solutions
could be sought in order to decentralise philosophy, by opening
up possibilities for the diversification and localisation of
knowledge and ‘provincializing’ the West in philosophy.
Introduction
Chinese philosophy is little known in France and is not officially recognised
by twenty-first century French philosophers as a philosophy. A philosophy
is here understood to be a critical and rational activity, made possible with
the emergence of the logos (or ‘reason’, ‘thought’, ‘discourse’ and ‘study’) in
ancient Greece, which aims to discover the truth through questioning, the
use of rationality, and the creation of concepts, and which became a
discipline developed and institutionalised in the West (Lalande, 1999: 774;
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Godin, 2004: 742, 979). French philosophers regard Chinese philosophy less
as alternative reasoning and more as wisdom, thought or spirituality. Within
France, Chinese philosophy is often called ‘Chinese thought’ (see, for
example, Jullien, 1998; Cheng, 1997; Granet, 2002), and only ‘Chinese
philosophy’ by a small number of authors (Billeter, 2002; Kaltenmark, 1994).
The French philosopher François Jullien employs China as the ‘other’ in
order to provoke thought within Western philosophy. He strongly
differentiates the Chinese wise man and the Greek philosopher (Jullien,
1998). He argues that “when somebody tells me that ‘Chinese thought is not
a philosophy’ I answer that ‘it is true, Chinese thought could develop itself
in that sense, but it has not made this choice’” (Jullien, 2004: 91). Alain Badiou
praises François Jullien for providing structures to Chinese thought, because
when he read Chinese thought without preparation and conceptual work,
he dismissed it as ‘small talk’, as did Hegel many years earlier (Badiou, 2007:
140).
However, when studied in detail, Chinese philosophy does deserve
to be included in the category ‘philosophy’ – understood to mean an activity
of thinking which tries to understand and to explain the world and human
existence, and which is common to humankind; a philosophy which is open
enough to not exclude anything that might help in this endeavour. This does
mean that Chinese philosophy lacks the European imperative of rationality,
and that Chinese philosophers deploy forms such as poetry and metaphor
which are not intrinsic to European philosophy. However, such differences
do not need to be seen as disqualifications. Chinese philosophy contains texts
which demonstrate an act of thinking, an attempt to explain the world and
humankind as well as reflections on the organisation of society. For instance,
Zhuangzi, written by the Taoist philosopher of the same name in the 4th
century BC, contains reflections on death, the political organisation of
society, and happiness. The Zhuangzi also shows reflections that could be
considered as ‘naturalist’.1
Why, then, is Chinese philosophy isolated from philosophy in France?
Is it perhaps only the Western world that has the right and the ability to
think? Does China not think? This idea that Chinese philosophy is not a
philosophy was first linked to the introduction of Chinese culture and
philosophy in France in the 16th century by the Jesuit missionaries.
Philosophers of the Enlightenment read and relayed the content of the
Edifying and Curious Letters of some Missioners, of the Society of Jesus, from
Foreign Missions to the next generations of philosophers, and so on from there
to later philosophers. But these descriptions are skewed. Jesuits were in
contact with just one ‘social class’ of the Chinese population, namely, the
Mandarins. They also had to justify their missions to Rome and present
China in a positive light. However, at that time, Chinese philosophy was
Frainais-Maitre: The Coloniality of Western Philosophy10
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considered as a philosophy by philosophers of the Enlightenment, such as
Voltaire. But in the 19th century, through the rise of Orientalism and
scientific racism, the old admiration for China transformed into contempt,
as described by Hegel. Hegel argued that China, representing the beginning
of the abstraction and the childhood age of the Spirit, has no philosophy
(Hegel, 1964: 16; 1965: 287).
In his book Orientalism (1978), the theorist Edward W. Said (1935-2003)
describes ‘Orientalism’ as a constellation of false assumptions underlying
Western attitudes toward the East. Orientalism is depicted as the Western
style of dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient as
well as the constitutive discourse of the West on the Orient. The Orient is the
object of the discourse’s message and its authors are the Orientalists. From
the 16th century onwards, generations of philosophers had built an
imaginary of Chinese philosophy which is still observable in academic
discourse today.2 The status of Chinese philosophy in France has been
studied in the journal Extrême Orient – Extrême Occident, with the special issue
“Y a-t-il une philosophie Chinoise?” [Is there a Chinese philosophy?]. In this
issue, the authors noted that Chinese philosophy is not considered as a
philosophy. Most articles try to resolve this problem of the existence of
Chinese philosophy, but in general the problem is studied within the
Western categories of philosophy, and Chinese philosophy is analysed
through a Western lens. This makes the problem appear insoluble (see
Cheng, 2005). Jean-Francois Billeter has also tried to explicate Chinese
philosophy through translations of original texts which contrast with
traditional representations of Chinese philosophy as mysticism. This
mysticism maintains the myth of the radical otherness of China (see Billeter,
2002; 2006). 
John J. Clarke, scholar of the history of ideas, has also contributed to
the study of how the West received ‘Oriental’ philosophies. He aims to
highlight the narrowness of Eurocentric intellectual historiography by
evoking key moments of the encounter between the two ‘sides’ of the world,
and by examining the intellectual relations between West and East (see
Clarke, 1997). Anne Cheng wondered in her inaugural lecture at the Collège
de France, ‘Does China think’? Cheng stressed that the main issue has always
been to ‘think China’, but she also asked if China is even allowed to think
and think for itself (see Cheng, 2009). Finally, Carine Defoort and Rein Raud
discussed this subject in a journal entitled Philosophy East and West. Defoort
studied the problem of the existence of Chinese philosophy and extracted
four possible positions, while Rein Raud reproached Defoort for failing to
get to the bottom of the problem, namely, Eurocentrism (see Defoort, 2001;
2006; and Raud, 2006). 
This paper aims to understand the contention – ‘Chinese philosophy
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is not a philosophy’ – through a colonialist, orientalist and Eurocentrist
reading. Eurocentrism is understood here as a kind of ethnocentrism and as
an ideology (conscious or unconscious) to focus on, and take as its lead,
European concerns, culture and values, at the expense of those of other
cultures.3 As such, a key question is the following: Is it because the world
remains in a persistent intellectual coloniality and an entrenched
Eurocentrism of thought that the West does not recognise philosophies of
the others?
The Centrality of Western Philosophy
The centrality of the West in its perception of knowledge can be studied in
order to understand why the West represents other philosophies as ‘non-
philosophies’. Concepts of ‘West’ and ‘East’, or ‘Occident’ and ‘Orient’, are
cultural, geographic and politically instituted concepts. As Said argued, the
ideas of ‘Orient’ and ‘Occident’ have “a history and a tradition of thought,
imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence” (2003: 5).
Orientalism produces imaginative geographies and the West has constructed
itself in comparison to the Orient (Gregory, 2004: 4). Uta Janssens has also
argued that the West defined and still defines itself in contrast to the East,
“with the result that the two concepts are dependent upon a series of
opposing values” (2007: 223). The border between West and East has, thus,
been invented and reproduced over time. 
The discourse of Orientalism created a series of binary oppositions
and pairs, and Occident and Orient are an important example of this. In this
construction and representation of the world, the West seems to represent
the strong and superior centre of the world with the rest serving as its
peripheries. This idea of the West as a centre can be found in the field of
history as argued by Naoki Sakai, specialist of Japanese intellectual history.
For him, “history seemed to be an eternal process of unification and
centralization with Europe at the centre. Hence, we designed the history
simply as a process of Europeanization” (Sakai, 2001: 91). This phenomenon
of the appropriation of the world by the West has its origin in the expansion
of European religion developed by the Jesuits and exported through
colonisation. This expansion can be observed today in the phenomenon of
globalisation. Globalisation is the global extension of cultural, political and
economic exchanges. This phenomenon has primarily been a process of
unequal exchange and absolute domination with the Occident/West and the
Global North at its centre transferring their culture to the Third World, the
South and the Orient/East (Bessis, 2001: 27-28). 
According to Sophie Bessis (2001: 7), Western supremacy is not only
present in personal feelings, but also appears to structure society through
12
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discourse and intellectual spheres. These assertions can be understood
through the idea that Orientalism is a discourse constructed through
stereotypes, images and representations. The West interprets, depicts and
speaks for the Orient. In this sense, the West produces a categorised discourse
(Said, 2003: 129; 56). Said, through the works of Michel Foucault (1966; 1975),
has identified Orientalism as a discourse that helps to understand the
Western systematic discipline that allowed Western culture to manage and
to produce the Orient (Said, 2003: 3). This context can help us understand
why, generally speaking, Western philosophy is considered as the only
philosophy, ‘the’ philosophy among French academics. The other
philosophies do not matter because they are folk wisdom, confined to
orbiting around the centre as peripheries, neglected and inferior, never able
to reach the privileged higher status of Western philosophy. Thus,
philosophy is the property of the West. This situation is fixed by an imagined
origin which ‘took root’ in Ancient Greece, and then in Europe more widely.
This ability to think and philosophise is denied to others. Western
philosophy is seen as the matrix of thought, and every thought which
diverges from it is not acceptable because it jeopardises the West’s central
and dominant position.
It seems that behind this question of the ability of the others to think,
there are remnants of a colonialist thought and a persistent Orientalism. This
is the case for the questioning of the existence of Chinese philosophy by
Western philosophers, questioning which is linked to entrenched forms of
intellectual colonialism. It might appear that with decolonisation in the
second half of the 20th century these notions of colonial influence and
domination by the West on the world have disappeared. But this is not the
case. For sociologist Anibal Quijano, the most powerful myth of the 21st
century consists in the idea that “the elimination of the colonial
administrations is equal to the decolonization of the world” (Grosfoguel,
2006: 60-61). Indeed, the ‘post’ of ‘postcolonialism’ indicates that “coloniality
continues under new forms; and post-Occidentalism indicates that
Occidentalism continues to be reproduced under new forms” (Mignolo,
2000: 30).
According to Quijano, the concept of ‘coloniality of power’ is “a
system constituted by multiple and heterogeneous forms of sexual, political,
epistemic, economic, spiritual, linguistic and racial hierarchies and systems
of global domination and exploitation” (Quijano, 1993; 2000; in Grosfoguel,
2006: 57). From this perspective, coloniality and modernity are two sides of
the same coin. Coloniality is the “continuity of the domination and of the
forms of exploitation which follow the disappearance of colonial
administrations produced by hegemonic structures and cultures of the
capitalist/patriarchal modern/colonial world-system” (Grosfoguel, 2006: 61).
Frainais-Maitre: The Coloniality of Western Philosophy 13
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It seems that coloniality is beyond colonialism and constitutes a set of values
which structures an ideology born with the modern/colonial world in the
16th century (with the encounter of America by Christopher Columbus and
other explorers). This is a principle and a control strategy which goes beyond
simple economic exploitation. Coloniality institutes Eurocentrism which
becomes a source of religious, ethnic and (especially) epistemic
discriminations. It implies the coloniser’s behaviour as well as the
comportment of the colonised. 
Coloniality is therefore not only economic but also intellectual.
According to the geographer Philippe Pelletier, Western expansion has not
only been “economic and political but also cultural and intellectual” (2006:
85-86). The foundations of knowledge were found (and are still found) in
Western civilisation and in its multiple and complex possibilities, as long as
the conceptualisation (of the right and of the left) remains within the
framework of language and modernity (Fals-Borda, 1971; in Mignolo, 2001:
59-60) As Mignolo explains:
From the 16th to the 21th centuries, the colonial difference has
been the mechanism which has undervalued the non-western
knowledge. The double epistemic conscience of the ‘how to be
an African philosopher’ (Eze) or ‘an Indian historian’
(Chakrabarty) is still relevant today. The monotypic episteme
of modernity is facing the pluritopic episteme of coloniality 
[. . .] This is an episteme of borders, of the edge of the thought,
announced from the perspective of the coloniality (2001: 57)
Intellectual coloniality is illustrated by, for instance, the export of Western
concepts and disciplines to Asia at the end of the 19th century. This
knowledge is exported via the expansion of the epistemic and philosophical
Western concepts as much as by the classification of the social sciences and
humanities. This global expansion of ”the social sciences implies that
intellectual coloniality remains in place, even if this colonization is caused
by good intentions, made by people of the left and supports decolonization”
(Mignolo, 2001: 60).
China and the Academic Disciplines in France
The humanities, which are built using Western categories, organise the
relationship between the world and knowledge through an interplay of
subjective techniques and practices. Naoki Sakai and Osamu Nishitani have
described a classification which organises the world of knowledge and
humanities. This is the distinction between humanitas, as subject of
knowledge, and anthropos, as object of knowledge (Solomon and Habib, 2005:
14
SSPT 19 [WIP]:SSPT  23/08/2011  16:43  Page 14
94).4 In light of this, China has been represented by the West as a concept or
an object of study. Chinese philosophy in France suffers from its construction
as an object of study, rendering it always inferior to French philosophical
offerings. Chinese philosophy is used as an argument, a case that the Western
philosopher uses in order to improve his or her system.5
Chinese philosophy is also used by some French philosophers in
helping to understand silences in Western thought.6 In the preface to the
French edition of Said’s Orientalism, Tzvetan Todorov wrote that domination
could be expressed by this concept. If you say to somebody “‘I have the truth
about you’ it is informing the nature of my knowledge but it is also a
relationship in which ‘I’ dominate and the other is dominated” (Said, 2003:
8). In his relation with China, the Western philosopher is in a position of
domination because he ‘has the truth’ about the other because he judges and
gives (or denies) the ‘philosophy’ label. This use of categories in order to
distinguish between ‘philosophy’ and ‘Chinese philosophy’ illustrates an
argument employed by the sociologist Christine Delphy. According to her,
to classify is to hierarchise. The power of language and of the discourse is to
name something or someone, and then create a reality, a group, and in
particular to distinguish ‘us’ and the ‘others’ (see Sharp, 2009: 18). 
Classification of the philosophies hierarchises them because these two
operations are linked and function simultaneously (Delphy, 2008: 40). This
notion of domination can be characterised by discourse because the master
is the one who is speaking, he speaks for the other and of the other. Language
participates in the West’s intellectual hegemonic construction of ‘others’.
Orientalism has been described as knowledge on the Orient but also as
power. As Michel Foucault argued in Discipline and Punish, power implies
knowledge and both are constituted together: “there is no power relation
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power
relations” (Foucault, 1975: 27). Foucault thought that language is a function
of power. Thus, power circulates in the context of representation. There is a
connection between differences, power and representations. It is an exercise
of the symbolic power through representational practices. The stereotypes
created by language are a key point in symbolic violence. Power is not only
to constrain but it is also to produce (Hall, 1997: 261). In the case of Chinese
philosophy, this power allows for the production of new objects of
knowledge (such as the Orient), and new forms of knowledge (such as
Orientalism).
The other key point which could help to explain why Chinese
philosophy is not seen as a philosophy in France is the universalisation of
Western knowledge. One of the central claims of Western philosophy is its
universalist vocation, a pretention to the universal which is the characteristic
of Europe, according to Jürgen Habermas (2008). As Kenta Ohji and
Frainais-Maitre: The Coloniality of Western Philosophy 15
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Mickhael Xifaras underline, the German philosopher has argued, without
any contradiction and without using the metaphysical conception of the
universal, that pretention to the universal is a characteristic of the West and
the criterion of valid norms for everywhere and any time (Ohji and Xifaras,
1999: 42). 
Universalism is also the mask of ethnocentrism. In this vein, Todorov
has argued that the universal hid the will of European ethnocentrism or
Eurocentrism (1989: 510). In that sense, it is not possible to recognise an
origin for philosophy other than Greece, nor a philosophy (Chinese
philosophy, for example) other than Western philosophy. Enrique Dussel
proposes that the origin of this universalist belief can be found in Descartes
who initiated the ‘ego-politic’ of knowledge. Descartes placed European man
at the level of God inasmuch as he thought the foundation of knowledge was
the ‘first and indubitable principle’. Dussel argues that ego cogito was
preceded by ego conquistus, ‘I conquer therefore I am’ (1977; in Grosfoguel,
2006: 53). Europe has created ‘the universal’ but has limited its areas of
application. This is a process of exclusion. Nowadays, the creators of this
notion of the universal have not renounced their right to apply it. They
continue to classify what is inside and outside the universal. 
The consequence of the universalisation of knowledge is that thoughts
are not situated. Thus, the West assumes the paternity of thoughts. Walter
Mignolo quotes Enrique Dussel who speaks about the lack of situated
thought, which for him shows “the vagueness of the European modern
capitalist universal” (Mignolo, 2001: 60). The concealment of the localisation
of the subject’s enunciation implies a hierarchy of knowledge. After
appropriating the origin of bright ideas for knowledge, Europe was able to
claim intellectual authority and establish the ‘others’ as inferior. This
situation has logically permitted its domination over the others, and the
possibility to colonise them in order to ‘educate’ and give them superior
knowledge; the latter of which may arise from the others themselves. As a
consequence, this lack of localisation of the subject feeds the universalist
myth. Indeed, by not declaring who is at the origin of an idea or discovery,
the West appropriates this idea and at the same time erases the origin of the
idea or discovery. This is what happened historically in printing technology.
Gutenberg in Germany is said to be the inventor of printing because in 1440
he had the idea to use movable lead characters to print. But according to
Joseph Needham and Etiemble, this technique was already used for centuries
in China.7
By the erasure of the localisation of the subject in the power and
epistemic relationship, Western philosophy and science
managed to produce a universalist myth which covers, or rather
16
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hides the epistemic localisation in power relationships from
which the subject speaks (Grosfoguel, 2006: 53)
Thus, the West takes on the ‘good role’ by colonising the others in
order to provide them with science and civilisation, and this constitutes a
reason to extend its intellectual and spatial territory. The West believes in its
civilising mission as well as in its economic interests. In the 19th century and
the beginning of the 20th century, all the European political movements
argued that humanity was led by an order, a scale, and that the top of this
hierarchy was occupied by the West. Sophie Bessis conceives of this idea as
the “serious mission of civilizing that the white man undertakes, and which
then can be used as an excuse for all its enterprises” (2001: 43). 
Clues for a Decentralisation and a Decolonisation of Western Philosophy 
Solutions proposed by post-colonial theories can help to de-centralise and
de-colonise French philosophy. First, it is possible to counteract the idea that
the West is the only one to hold knowledge and so has the power to dominate
the others. A solution could be to practise a relativism regarding cultures
and knowledge in the world. The categories of the Western disciplines are
founded upon Western criteria which have been instituted by specific
definitions. Many French philosophers refuse China and others the ability
to philosophise, because recognising these ‘other’ philosophies might
decentre Western philosophy. According to Mignolo, 
It is crucial [. . .] to rethink the articulations in the production
and distribution of knowledge, and the role of the Humanities,
the Social Sciences and the Natural Sciences in the corporate
university under which we are living and working. [. . .] [I]t
implies going beyond national literatures and looking at the
larger picture in the structure of colonial power, language and
the interstate system (2000: 14) 
The second solution could be to invert the process of comparison
between the centre and the periphery which feeds intellectual coloniality
and Orientalism. This comparison could be illustrated by the grammatical
construction ‘they are like us’, where the word ‘they’ means the ‘others’, and
the word ‘us’ means the West. It could therefore be a solution to practice a
post-colonial language as Naoki Sakai has argued. According to Sakai, this
declaration – ‘they are like us’ – refers to the “conviction of the annihilation
of the other”, which in its “otherness, is probably the mission of the monist
history” (2001: 93). The alternative could be the expression, ‘we are like
Frainais-Maitre: The Coloniality of Western Philosophy 17
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them’, but in this expression the centrality of the West is no longer ensured. 
A third solution for restoring the wholes shattered by the universalist
discourse of Western philosophy could be to take into account the geopolitics
of knowledge. A way to practice this idea would be to highlight the spatiality
of epistemology and to thoroughly historicise it. That is to say, one has to
seek where and when an idea has been thought. This exercise will
consequently de-centralise Western thought. It will highlight several
epistemological foci worldwide, with none appearing superior to any other.
According to Mignolo, “epistemology is not a-historic. It is not anymore a
linear history which goes from Greece to the production of Western
contemporary knowledge. Epistemology must be spatialised, historicised by
playing the colonial difference” (2001: 61). Thus, a solution could be to put
the West in perspective and not to place it in the centre but as a region among
others. 
Such ideas echo Dispesh Chakrabarty’s proposal to provincialise
Europe, particularly in the field of history (see Chakrabarty, 2000). This
solution would be to think of every culture, every civilisation, as a result of
exchanges between, and contacts and bonds with, others. Whether such a
universalist humanism can be counterbalanced by respect for
epistemological diversity remains to be seen. 
Conclusion
These ‘clues’ have helped us to better understand these issues by considering
to what extent China ‘thinks’, or if it is only the Western world that has the
right and the ability to think. The issue of the existence of other philosophies,
such as Chinese philosophy, may be explained with a colonialist, orientalist
and Eurocentrist perspective. The main reason being that philosophy,
understood as Western philosophy, is centralised because the West is seen
as the centre of world knowledge. Western philosophy is marked by
Eurocentrism and by coloniality of thought. Western philosophy considers
itself as dominant, and this idea gives it the asserted right to colonise and
civilise others. The ‘others’ think of themselves in comparison to the West,
and the hierarchy of knowledge implies that Chinese philosophy is seen as
a peripheral and unable to reach the centre represented by Western
philosophy. The universalism of Western philosophy is reinforced by
centralism and intellectual coloniality, as well as the lack of temporal and
spatial situation of the thoughts in the world. The relativism of cultures and
knowledge, as well as the spacialisation and historicisation of knowledge,
could help to decentre Western philosophy. A modification of the way to
construct comparisons between forms of knowledge could also help to break
the schema of ‘centre and peripheries’ that is so often identified. These clues
18
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could help French scholars to correct their “cultural myopia” (Clarke, 1997:
114) and allow for the practice of a new way of thinking about the world and
the many philosophies within it.
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Endnotes
1 See Zhuangzi (1980: 254). 
2 The concept of ‘imaginaire’ or ‘imaginary’ is borrowed from Cornélius
Castoriadis and means ‘invention’ (see Castoriadis, 1975).
3 On these notions of ethnocentrism and eurocentrism, see Todorov (1989).
4 See Sakai and Nishitani (1999).
5 For instance, Montesquieu in the 18th century used China to improve his
political system (see Montesquieu, 1951).
6 François Jullien, a French philosopher, uses Chinese philosophy in order
to understand the ‘unthought-of’ in Western thought (see Jullien and
Marchaisse, 2000: 189).
7 See Needham (1954) and Etiemble (1988).
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